University of Mississippi

eGrove
AICPA Annual Reports

American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) Historical Collection

1996

Annual report 1995-1996
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. SEC Practice Section. Public Oversight
Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_arprts
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. SEC Practice Section. Public Oversight Board, "Annual
report 1995-1996" (1996). AICPA Annual Reports. 51.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_arprts/51

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) Historical Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in AICPA Annual Reports by an
authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

P

u b l i c

Annual
Report
1995-1996

POB

O
V E R S I G H T

B

o a r d

About

the

S E C

P r a c t i c e S e c t i o n and the P u b l i c O v e r s i g h t B o a r d

Th e S E C P S ___________________________________________________________
The SEC Practice Section ("SECPS" or the "Section") was founded in 1977 as part of the
Division for CPA Firms of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA")
and its activities are overseen by the Public Oversight Board (the "Board" or the "POB").
The Section imposes membership requirements and administers a number of programs to
help insure that SEC clients are audited by member accounting firms with adequate
quality control systems. Member firms are required to participate in (1) peer review,
through which Section members have their practices reviewed every three years by other
accountants and (2) quality control inquiry, which reviews allegations of audit failure
contained in litigation filed against member firms relating to SEC clients and certain other
entities to determine if the firms' quality control systems require revision or there should
be stricter compliance with the firms' quality control policies and procedures and/or the
Section's membership requirements.

The requirements of the SECPS
affect more than 112,608
professionals at 1,300 member
firms that audit more than
14,869 SEC clients.

Th e P OB
The POB is an autonomous
body of five members with a
broad spectrum of business,
professional, regulatory and
legislative experience. The
Board's independence is
assured by its power to
appoint its own members,
chairperson and staff, set its
own budget, and establish its
own operating procedures. It
oversees all SECPS activities.
The Board's primary
responsibility is to represent
the public interest (1) when the
Section sets, revises or enforces
standards, membership
requirements, rules or
procedures and (2) when
SECPS committees consider the
results of individual peer
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reviews or the possible quality
control implications of
litigation alleging audit failure.
The Board believes its
responsibilities also include the
monitoring of all matters and
developments that may affect
public confidence in the
integrity of the audit process.
The 1995 Annual Report of the
Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC")
acknowledges that the POB's
activities have not been limited
to oversight of the profession's
self-regulatory programs but
also are directed to improving
the financial reporting process.

Corporate Governance
A p p r o a c h to I m p r o v e d
Financial Reporting
During 1995, the Board
prepared and distributed a
summary report of one of the
key recommendations
contained in the report of the
Board's Advisory Panel on

Auditor Independence entitled
Strengthening the Professionalism
of the Independent Auditor. That
summary, Directors,
Management, and Auditors—
Allies in Protecting Shareholder
Interests, urges adoption of a
corporate governance
approach to improve financial
reporting and has been widely
distributed to over 50,000 chief
executive and financial officers
and directors of public
companies. The centerpiece of
this approach is enhanced
communication, particularly
between the auditors and the
board of directors. In that
regard, the report urges
corporate boards and the
independent auditor to engage
in candid communication
about the appropriateness, not
just acceptability, of accounting
principles and estimates and
the clarity of the related
disclosures of financial
information.
The Board is considering
other ways to encourage
further acceptance and
implementation of the
corporate governance
recommendation among those
who have the responsibility for
corporate governance. The
Board strongly believes that a
close relationship between the
auditor and the board of
directors/audit committee will
enhance the ability of directors
to discharge their critically
important corporate
governance responsibilities
related to financial reporting
while at the same time
strengthening auditor
professionalism and
independence.

The SEC Practice Section
has endorsed the recommenda
tion for enhanced communica
tion. A task force of the Peer
Review Committee has been
formed to identify "best
practices" that SECPS firms
have adopted to accomplish
the objective of more candid
communication between the
auditor and the board. It has
requested information from the
firms of the members of the
Peer Review Committee and
has designed a survey
questionnaire that has been
used to compile information
about implementation on the
SEC engagements that are
subjected to review in the 1996
peer reviews of firms with five
or more such engagements.
The results will be summarized
with a view to communicating
best practices to all SECPS
firms.

G A O R e p o r t on the
Accounting Profession
In September 1996 the General
Accounting Office ("GAO"), in
response to a congressional
request, published a study of
the manner in which the
accounting profession had
responded to recommenda
tions of various bodies,
entitled The Accounting
Profession—Major Issues:
Progress and Concerns. While
identifying continuing
problems such as indepen
dence and the detection of
fraud, the GAO generally
found that the profession had
responded well to the
recommendations that were
made. The POB was consulted
by the GAO in the course of
preparing the report and the
POB submitted written

comments in response to the
exposure draft. The report
commended the SECPS and the
POB for their work in
strengthening the audit process
and took particular note of the
Board sponsored report of the
Advisory Panel on Auditor
Independence.

Litigation Reform
The Board supported the
efforts of the profession to
persuade Congress to adopt
legislation which would
substitute, for the long
standing principle of "joint
and several liability" of
defendants in private securities
cases, the principle of
"separate and proportionate
liability." Under the former
practice, any defendant in a
securities action could be
compelled to pay the entire
amount of a judgment
regardless of the extent to
which his conduct contributed
to the plaintiffs' losses. Under
a "separate and proportionate
standard" each defendant
would only be liable to the
extent to which his conduct
causes the losses. The Board's
support, expressed in
testimony before a Congres
sional committee considering
the matter, was the conse
quence of a careful study of the
matter which concluded that
the "joint and several" practice
imposed significant unfairness
on defendants in securities
litigation. Late in 1995
Congress overrode the
President's veto of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform
Act which included a provision

for "separate and proportion
ate liability" in most cases
among defendants in securities
cases.
It is too soon to judge the
impact of this new law on the
liability of auditor defendants.
However, there are some
indications that fewer cases are
being filed against auditors,
although this may be for
reasons other than the new
legislation.

Board Me e t i n g s
The Board and its staff held
seven regularly scheduled
meetings during the year in
connection with its oversight
of the self-regulatory programs
of the SECPS and its
consideration of issues having
a bearing on the credibility and
effectiveness of the auditor.
The three-day October meeting
was a "retreat meeting," which
the Board periodically holds to
(1) review the effectiveness of
the self-regulatory programs
and the Board's oversight role
and (2) evaluate matters
relating to the quality of
independent auditing and
financial reporting in the U.S.
At the meeting, the Board
exchanged views with the
Comptroller General of the
U.S. General Accounting
Office, the Chief Accountant of
the SEC and an Associate Chief
Accountant, the chair of the
SECPS, and the chair and vice
chair of the Financial
Accounting Standards Board.
Guests of the Board at other
meetings included the
immediate past AICPA
president, the current AICPA
president, the vice-chair of the

AICPA, the Chief Accountant
of the SEC, the chair of the
Financial Accounting
Foundation, the chair of the
SECPS Executive Committee,
the chair of the AICPA Special
Committee on Assurance
Services, the chair of the
Quality Control Inquiry
Committee, the AICPA Vice
President-Self-Regulation, and
the senior QCIC staff person.
Those present at the retreat
meeting and other meetings
urged the Board to continue to
view its role broadly. As one
participant observed, the
Board has appropriately
assumed the role of "creative
irritant" to the auditing
profession and encouraged the
Board to continue that role.
In addition to exchanging
views with those present at
formal POB meetings, the
Board's chairman, other Board
members and the Executive
Director and staff interacted
with SEC Chairman Levitt and
the Chief Accountant on a
number of occasions on the
subject of auditor indepen
dence as well as with the
SECPS Executive Committee
chair and chair of the SECPS
Task Force on Auditor
Independence; the AICPA
president concerning the
allocation of resources to
support the self-regulatory
programs, particularly the
Quality Control Inquiry
Committee; the Auditing
Standards Board on the subject
of the proposed auditing
standard, Consideration of Fraud
in a Financial Statement Audit;
and with representatives of the

accounting profession in the
U.K. on the subject of
establishing a public oversight
board in the U.K.
The chairman of the POB
addressed the spring meeting
of the AICPA Council and
discussed POB activities with
the AICPA board of directors.
The Board's staff
participated in the delibera
tions of SECPS task forces on
Auditor Independence, Quality
Control Standards, Implemen
tation of and Transition to
Revised Quality Control
Standards, Best Practices,
Oversight in the Year 2000, and
Technology.

The J o h n J. M c C l o y
Award
The POB awarded the 1996
John J. McCloy Award for
Outstanding Contributions to
Audit Excellence to David B.
Pearson whose career has been
characterized by his leadership
and commitment to improving
the quality of the accounting
profession's self-regulatory
programs. He has unfailingly
placed the public interest in the
forefront as a member, then
chair, of the SECPS Peer
Review Committee and as an
engagement partner of several
large firm peer reviews. In
these activities and in
contributing to the auditing
standard setting process and to
the improvement of the quality
of university and continuing
education, Mr. Pearson's views
have always been shaped by
the importance of maintaining
public confidence in the
profession.
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Oversight

of the

SECPS

One or more Board members and staff members attend each meeting of the SECPS
Executive Committee and its Planning Committee and participate as appropriate. The
Executive Committee is the SECPS's governing body. It establishes the Section's
membership requirements and supervises the activities of the Peer Review Committee
("PRC"), the Quality Control Inquiry Committee ("QCIC"), the SEC Regulations Committee,
and the Professional Issues Task Force ("PITF").

The PITF was formed in 1994
in response to a Board
recommendation to identify
and consider practice issues
that present high audit risk
and to disseminate relevant
guidance. During the year, the
PITF issued three Practice
Alerts entitled "Complex

Major Corrective
Measures Imposed by
the Peer Review
Committee to Ensure
that Quality Control
Deficiencies
are Corrected

Derivatives," "Auditing Related
Parties and Related-Party
Transactions," and "The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995."
The SECPS completed its
monitoring of compliance with
the requirement that AICPA
members that practice before
the SEC be enrolled in the
SECPS. With assistance from

Executive

Committee

the SEC Chief Accountant's
staff, an Executive Committee
task force is conducting an
outreach program to identify
and invite other firms that are
not members of the SECPS but
audit SEC clients to join the
SECPS.
The SECPS chair wrote to
all SECPS firms advising them
that applicable membership
requirements, including
concurring review and partner
rotation, are applicable to
engagements for which a
member serves as principal
auditor of record of an
employee stock purchase,
savings or similar plan that
files a Form 11-K with the SEC

Action

pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.
The Executive Committee
approved a Memorandum of
Understanding prepared by the
QCIC which codified the
unwritten understanding that
had guided the SEC staff's
access to information about
closed QCIC cases. This
memorandum was transmitted
to the Office of the Chief
Accountant.

Number of Times
During
Since
Inception
1995-96

Accelerated peer review

1

52

Employment of an outside consultant acceptable
to the Peer Review Committee to perform
preissuance reviews of financial statements or
other specified procedures

8

74

Revisits by the peer reviewers or visits by a
committee member to ascertain progress made
by the firm in implementing corrective actions

7

194

25

304

Review of changes made to the firm's quality
control document or other manuals and checklists

1

43

Continuing Professional Education in specified areas

3

*4 2

Review of the planning for and results of the
firm's internal inspection program

* Since July 1 , 1988.

Oversight

of the
P eer

R eview

A primary responsibility of the Board is to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the
Section's peer review process, including the activities of its Peer Review Committee. Peer
review is an independent, rigorous evaluation of the design of a firm's quality control
system for its accounting and auditing practice, and an assessment of a firm's compliance
with that system. It is the cornerstone of the CPA profession's self-regulatory program and
its principal method of assuring the public that member firms are performing at a level
that meets or exceeds professional standards. Because of the significance and magnitude
of the peer review process, the Board and its staff allocate substantial resources to the
oversight of the peer review process to assure that it is vigorous and effective.

One or more Board members
and staff members regularly
attend and participate
proactively in meetings of the
PRC. The Board's staff reports
to the Board at each of its
meetings on the performance
of the committee in setting
standards, processing reports,
following-up on mandated
corrective actions, and dealing
with substandard performance
of individual peer review
teams.
Every peer review
administered by the committee
is monitored by the Board's
staff. The level of oversight
varies in intensity according to
the characteristics of reviewed
firms and the past performance
history of reviewed firms and
review teams. In 1995-96, the
Board's staff attended the
reviews of approximately 25%
of firms with SEC clients,
including 100% of firms with
thirty or more SEC clients, for
the purpose of testing
compliance with the peer
review standards. Firms with

SEC clients that received a
qualified or adverse opinion
on their prior review were
visited with greater frequency
than others. For all other firms
with SEC clients, the staff
reviewed selected working
papers and the reports, letters
of comments and response and
discussed significant issues
identified with peer reviewers
to satisfy itself that all such
issues were properly resolved
and reported. The staff
participated in all the meetings
of task forces of the PRC
regarding evaluation of
individual peer reviews and
communicated any concerns it
had about the conduct of or
reporting on reviews. The staff
is satisfied that all such
concerns were adequately
considered by the PRC.
The Board's staff monitored
the activities of task forces of
the PRC. One such task force
was the Task Force on
Associations of CPA Firms. An
association of CPA firms is a
group of firms that join
together to achieve a variety of
objectives. These may include
pooling resources to enhance

Process

their ability to (a) render
professional services—for
example, through joint
education programs, inter-firm
consultation, and peer
review—and (b) market such
services. Present guidelines
proscribe associations that
administer peer reviews of its
member firms from warranting
or making representations
regarding the quality of
professional services
performed by member firms or
conducting marketing efforts
on behalf of members. The task
force concluded and the PRC
concurred that the perfor
mance of certain marketing
activities on behalf of member
firms should continue to be
regarded as a violation of the
independence requirements in
the SECPS's Guidelines for
Involvement by Associations of
CPA Firms if the association
arranges for and carries out
peer reviews of its own
members.
The PRC's Oversight in the
Year 2000 Task Force is close to
completing its efforts and
expects to issue a report in
1997. Its recommendations are
intended to assure that the
peer review process continues
to be relevant and results in
continuous improvement in
the quality of member firms'
audit practices.
The Board's staff
participated, with the AICPA
Joint Task Force on Quality
Control Standards, in the
drafting of the Guide for

Establishing and Maintaining
Quality Control for a CPA Firm's
Accounting and Auditing
Practice. This guide contains
recommendations to assist CPA
firms in implementing revised
Quality Control Standards.
While improving the
quality of audits of individual
member firms continues to be
the primary focus of peer
review, the PRC believes that
the program should be a
source of information to the
standard-setters to assure that
quality control and auditing
standards are relevant and
effective in assuring that firms
are prepared to deal with
emerging practice issues in
their individual practices.
Consequently, the PRC referred
a number of such issues to
standard-setters, which
described the issues for
practitioners, principally in
Audit Risk Alerts.
It is the Board's conclusion,
based on its oversight
program, that the SECPS peer
review program contributes to
the quality and consistency of
auditing in the United States.
The SEC, through the office
of the Chief Accountant,
oversees the peer review
process and POB oversight of
the process by randomly
inspecting peer review
working papers and POB files.
The SEC's inspection of the
1995 reviews is complete and
the Board expects the SEC to
continue to endorse the
SECPS's Peer Review Program
in its 1996 annual report.

Oversight

of the
Q
uality

Co n t r o l

The Quality Control Inquiry Committee determines whether allegations of audit failure
against SECPS member firms involving SEC registrants indicate a need for those firms to
take corrective actions to strengthen their quality control systems or to address personnel
deficiencies. The quality control inquiry process complements the peer review process.

The committee's work also on
occasion raises questions that
suggest the need to reconsider
or interpret professional
standards or suggest audit
practice issues where practical
guidance would benefit
practitioners. The QCIC refers
such matters to the PITF or
other bodies responsible for
issuing professional guidance.
Section member firms are
required to report and provide
to the QCIC copies of
complaints and amendments
of complaints within 30 days
of being served. This
requirement includes all
litigation involving the firm or
its personnel, or any publicly
announced investigation by a
regulatory agency, that alleges
deficiencies in the conduct of
an audit of an SEC registrant.
The QCIC also has the
authority to inquire into
complaints involving non
public entities where there is
significant public interest and
also into complaints filed
against auditors by federal and
state regulators alleging audit
failure in the conduct of an
audit of a financial institution.
The QCIC reviews the
complaints, financial
statements and regulatory
filings, trustee reports, SEC
enforcement releases, and
other publicly available
documents. If the committee's
preliminary analysis indicates
that the complaint is not
frivolous, the QCIC meets with
representatives of the accused
firm. The QCIC also may
review audit documentation
and firm guidance material for
the purpose of determining
whether the allegations against
the firm indicate a need for the
firm to strengthen quality

controls or issue additional
internal guidance. The QCIC
reviewed firm technical
guidance material and/or
audit documentation related to
the allegations in eight (8)
cases during this past year. The
QCIC occasionally becomes
aware of behavior by
individual CPAs that warrants
investigation. The QCIC refers
such matters to the AICPA
Professional Ethics Division. In
rare cases, the QCIC becomes
aware of regulatory rules that,
if amended, would better
protect the public interest. In
such cases, appropriate
regulatory agencies are so
informed.
The Board and its staff
monitor and evaluate the
effectiveness of all QCIC

I nquiry

Co m m i t t e e

activities. All committee and
task force meetings are
attended by the Board and/or
its staff and the Board has
unrestricted access to all
committee deliberations and
files. During the 1995-96 year,
the Board's staff participated in
all 35 QCIC task force meetings
at which QCIC members and
AICPA staff discussed the
allegations contained in
specific cases with representa
tives of the firms reporting the
litigation. The Board's staff
prepares comprehensive
reports on individual cases for
the Board's information and
responds to Board inquiries
about the process. The Board
and its staff are also actively
involved in the identification
and communication of areas
where professional standards
should be augmented.
The Board believes that the
QCIC process effectively
complements the peer review
process and that appropriate
consideration was given to the
46 cases closed during the year.

The SEC staff actively
oversees the QCIC process and
the attendant POB activities.
The SEC staff visited the POB's
offices several times during the
year to review the QCIC
prepared closed case
summaries and the POB files
on each case, which include
POB memoranda on task force
meetings.
During the past year, the
QCIC experienced delays in
the consideration and
processing of cases. These
delays primarily resulted from
the departure of experienced
QCIC staff who were
responsible for analyzing
complaints and related
financial statements, preparing
staff summaries and schedules,
and participating in task force
meetings. In the fall of 1996,
the Section hired two senior
staff persons and substantial
progress has been made in
eliminating the backlog of
open cases.

QCIC
Activity

7 /1 /9 5

through

6/30/96

6/30/95

Totals

A ctions R ela ted to Firms
Either a special review was made, the firm's
regularly scheduled peer review was expanded,
or other relevant work was inspected

3

62

65

A firm took appropriate corrective measures that
were responsive to the implications of the specific case

8

97

105

45

45

7

12

28

28

239

255

A ctions R ela ted to Standards
Appropriate AICPA technical bodies were asked
to consider the need for changes in, or guidance
on, professional standards
The Professional Issues Task Force was asked to
consider the issuance of a practice alert

5

A ctions R elated to In dividuals
The case was referred to the AICPA Professional
Ethics Division with a recommendation for
investigation into the work of specific individuals
16
(Note: Frequently more than one action is taken by the QCIC or by the firm on an individual case.)

6

11/1/79

through

P OB

Co m m e n t a r y
Fraud Detection
In the Board's 1993 Special Report, In the Public Interest, the Board observed:
"No problem confronting the profession is as demanding or as difficult to resolve, as the
problem of management fraud and its detection by auditors. Before the turn of the century
both auditors and users of audited financial information regarded the detection of fraud
as one of the primary purposes of an audit. For many reasons the profession has moved
from acceptance of that purpose to the view that its role in detecting fraud is secondary to
the other purposes of audits. In contrast, the public has continued to regard fraud
detection as an important goal of the audit process— and now attaches even greater
importance to that goal."
"The Board believes that, to a greater extent than it now does, the profession must accept
responsibility for the detection of fraud by management. The profession cannot, and it
cannot be expected to, develop methods that will assure that every fraud, no matter how
cleverly contrived, will be unearthed in the course of the audit, but it must develop means
of increasing significantly the likelihood of detecting fraud."
"The Board also recommends that the profession develop comprehensive guidelines to
further assist auditors in identifying symptoms that indicate the heightened likelihood of
management fraud involving the manipulation of financial information and specify
additional audit procedures when such symptoms appear. This undertaking should be
broad in scope and include the development of guidance to facilitate the analysis of both
financial data and non-financial factors that may be indicative of management fraud."

The Auditing Standards Board
("ASB") is in the final stages of
developing improved guidance
of the nature that the Board
suggested in its Special Report.
The Board has carefully
followed and provided
comment on the ASB's
proposed standard Consider
ation of Fraud in a Financial
Statement Audit and believes
that it clarifies the auditor's
responsibility to detect
fraudulent financial reporting
and will substantially assist the
auditor in meeting that
responsibility by including risk
factors identified by research
of past frauds, and explaining
how the auditor should assess,
document and respond to
those risk factors.
The ASB has done its job
well and it will now be the
responsibility of auditing firms
to implement the new standard
by revising their quality
control systems, educating
their personnel, and
conducting their audits with
heightened and experienced
skepticism. As many firms are
now "reengineering" their
audit approaches for other

reasons, this will be both a
challenge and an opportunity.

Auditor Independence
Since the inception of the
Public Oversight Board, no
topic has been the subject of
more Board discussion than
the subject of auditor
independence. In 1979, the
Board undertook a review of
non-audit services performed
by auditors of publicly held
companies, concluded that
some services were
incompatible with perceptions
of independence, and
counseled the profession to
undertake new non-audit
activities with caution and
circumspection. A Board
sponsored survey of public
perceptions about non-audit
services conducted in 1986
found considerable misgivings
among knowledgeable groups
about the performance of
certain services for audit
clients. More recently, in 1993
the Board published In the
Public Interest which reiterated
the Board's strongly held belief

about the importance of the
audit function in multi-line
service firms and the need to
enhance the perception of
auditor independence in
assuring the credibility of
financial reporting. In 1994, in
response to concerns expressed
by the then SEC Chief
Accountant about auditor
independence, the Board
formed an Advisory Panel on
Auditor Independence. The
Panel's report was referred to
above.
In 1995 and 1996, a number
of matters led the Board to
conclude that the time had
come for the profession to
reevaluate the adequacy of the
profession's Code of
Professional Conduct to deal
with present day indepen
dence questions. In a
December 2 7 , 1995 letter to
officials of the American
Institute of CPAs and the SEC
Practice Section, we urged that
"it is timely and appropriate
for the profession to consider
whether the Code of
Professional Conduct provides
an adequate framework and
guidance for addressing in a
timely manner the implications
of new service lines."
As a result of the Board's
letter, the chair of the Executive
Committee formed the Task
Force on Auditors' Indepen
dence When Performing NonAudit Services for an Attest
Client. This task force has held
a number of meetings to
address a number of
conceptual issues concerning
the nature of services that CPA
firms may render directly, or
indirectly through related
entities, for their SEC
registrant audit clients. The
Board's staff has participated
in all the meetings of this task
force. Staff of the Office of the
Chief Accountant of the SEC
has also participated in the
meetings. The task force's
work is ongoing at the date of
this report and many of the
issues under discussion are
contentious and consensus has
not yet been reached.

The Board is encouraged by
the substantive attention that is
being given to the issues being
discussed by the task force and
the professionalism of the
deliberations. However, the
proliferation of non-audit
services continues to grow, and
the character of some services
underlying this growth have
evolved away from being of an
advisory nature. For example,
firms now provide outsourcing
arrangements for many
corporate functions. The
implications of some of the
new services on auditor
independence are difficult to
assess; and thus they result in
skepticism by many observers
of the profession about auditor
objectivity. Because the root
causes of skepticism about
independence are not well
understood, efforts to deal
with scope of service issues
through rules and other
measures have not been
effective in addressing that
skepticism. As non-audit
services continue to grow, that
growth must be fostered in a
manner that avoids providing
services to audit clients that
undercut the perception of
auditor independence. Thus,
we believe that public
perceptions about auditor
independence need to be better
understood and that non-audit
services provided to public
companies need to be
measured against a more
conceptually sound
independence framework than
currently exists. It may be that,
with better understanding of
public perceptions and a more
consistent conceptual
framework, concerns about the
impact of certain non-audit
services on auditor indepen
dence may be mitigated.
The profession must again
demonstrate its ability to
succeed in creating institutions
and procedures commensurate
with the needs of the times. We
urge the profession to continue
its efforts to preserve and
strengthen self-regulation in
the accounting profession.
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Copies of the reports Strengthening the Professionalism
of the Independent Auditor and Directors, Management,
and Auditors—Allies in Protecting Shareholder Interests,
or additional copies of this report, can be obtained by
contacting the Public Oversight Board's offices.
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O n e Station Place, Stamford, C T 06902
(203) 353-5300

BOARD
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A. A. SOMMER, JR.
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Technical Director

ROBERT F. FROEHLKE

JOHN F. CULLEN
Assistant Technical Director

DONALD J. KIRK
MELVIN R. LAIRD

ALAN H. FELDMAN
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From the POB 1995 Report
DIRECTORS, MANAGEMENT, AND AUDITORS—
ALLIES IN PROTECTING SHAREHOLDER
INTERESTS
Wh a t the A u d i t C o m m i t t e e
S h o u l d Do
The POB urges that audit committees take action to ensure
that their charter or terms of reference include or provide for
the following:
■ An instruction to the independent auditor that the board of
directors, as the shareholders' representative, is the
auditor's client.
■ An expectation that financial management and the
independent auditor perform a timely analysis of significant
financial reporting issues and practices.
■ An expectation that financial management and the
independent auditor discuss with the audit committee their
qualitative judgments about the appropriateness, not just
the acceptability, of accounting principles and financial
disclosure practices used or proposed to be adopted by the
company and, particularly, about the degree of aggressive
ness or conservatism of its accounting principles and
underlying estimates.
■ An opportunity for the full board of directors to meet with
the independent auditor annually to help provide a basis for
the board to recommend to shareholders the appointment of
the auditor or ratification of the board's selection of the
auditor.

The audit committee discussion with the independent auditor
about the appropriateness of accounting principles and
financial disclosure practices should generally include the
following:
■ the auditor's independent qualitative judgments about the
appropriateness, not just the acceptability, of the accounting
principles and the clarity of the financial disclosure practices
used or proposed to be adopted by the company;
■ the auditor's views about whether management's choices of
accounting principles are conservative, moderate, or
extreme from the perspective of income, asset, and liability
recognition, and whether those principles are common
practices or are minority practices;
■ the auditor's reasoning in determining the appropriateness
of changes in accounting principles and disclosure practices;
■ the auditor's reasoning in determining the appropriateness
of the accounting principles and disclosure practices
adopted by management for new transactions or events;
■ the auditor's reasoning in accepting or questioning
significant estimates made by management;
■ the auditor's views about how the company's choices of
accounting principles and disclosure practices may affect
shareholders and public views and attitudes about the
company.

Copies of the reports Strengthening the Professionalism
of the Independent Auditor and Directors, Management,
and Auditors—Allies in Protecting Shareholder Interests,
or additional copies of this report, can be obtained by
contacting the Public Oversight Board's offices.
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DIRECTORS MANAGEMENT, AND AUDITORS—
ALLIES IN PROTECTING SHAREHOLDER
INTERESTS
Wha t t he A u d i t C o m m i t t e e
S h o u l d Do
The POB urges that audit committees take action to ensure
that their charter or terms of reference include or provide for
the following:
■ An instruction to the independent auditor that the board of
directors, as the shareholders' representative, is the
auditor's client.
■ An expectation that financial management and the
independent auditor perform a timely analysis of significant
financial reporting issues and practices.
■ An expectation that financial management and the
independent auditor discuss with the audit committee their
qualitative judgments about the appropriateness, not just
the acceptability, of accounting principles and financial
disclosure practices used or proposed to be adopted by the
company and, particularly, about the degree of aggressive
ness or conservatism of its accounting principles and
underlying estimates.
■ An opportunity for the full board of directors to meet with
the independent auditor annually to help provide a basis for
the board to recommend to shareholders the appointment of
the auditor or ratification of the board's selection of the
auditor.

The audit committee discussion with the independent auditor
about the appropriateness of accounting principles and
financial disclosure practices should generally include the
following:
■ the auditor's independent qualitative judgments about the
appropriateness, not just the acceptability, of the accounting
principles and the clarity of the financial disclosure practices
used or proposed to be adopted by the company;
■ the auditor's views about whether management's choices of
accounting principles are conservative, moderate, or
extreme from the perspective of income, asset, and liability
recognition, and whether those principles are common
practices or are minority practices;
■ the auditor's reasoning in determining the appropriateness
of changes in accounting principles and disclosure practices;
■ the auditor's reasoning in determining the appropriateness
of the accounting principles and disclosure practices
adopted by management for new transactions or events;
■ the auditor's reasoning in accepting or questioning
significant estimates made by management;
■ the auditor's views about how the company's choices of
accounting principles and disclosure practices may affect
shareholders and public views and attitudes about the
company.

